This paper considers the problem of consumption and investment in a financial market within a continuous time stochastic economy. The investor exhibits a change in the discount rate. The investment opportunities are a stock and a riskless account. The market coefficients and discount factor switch according to a finite state Markov chain. The change in the discount rate leads to time inconsistencies of the investor's decisions. The randomness in our model is driven by a Brownian motion and a Markov chain. Following [7] we introduce and characterize the subgame perfect strategies. Numerical experiments show the effect of time preference on subgame perfect strategies and the pre-commitment strategies.
Introduction
Dynamic asset allocation in a stochastic paradigm received a lot of scrutiny lately. The pioneer works are [15] and [16] . Many works then followed, most of them assuming an exponential discount function. [7] has given an overview of the literature in the context of Merton portfolio management problem with exponential discounting.
In this paper we consider a regime switching model for the financial market. This modeling is consistent with some cyclicality observed in financial markets. Many papers consider these types of markets for pricing derivative securities. Here we recall only two such works, [10] and [9] . When it comes to optimal investment in regime switching markets we point to [1] , [5] and [19] . All these papers consider a constant rate of time preference.
In our paper the discount rate is stochastic, exogenous and depends on the regime. By the best of our knowledge it is the first work to consider stochastic rates of time preference within the Merton problem framework. In a discrete time model [18] considers a cyclical discount factor. Next we motivate this modeling approach of discount rates. The issue of time discounting is the subject of many studies in financial economics. Several papers stepped away from the exponential discounting modeling, and based on empirical and experimental evidence proposed different discount models. In fact models with time varying discount rates have a long history, going back to Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930) . More recent works like [4] and [11] show that economic and social factors impact discount rates. [17] examins how the business cycles in the U.S. affects the rate of time preference. Therefore it appears natural to assume that discount rates vary with the state of economy (so are regime dependent).
Non constant discount rates lead to time inconsistency of the decision maker. The resolution is to consider subgame perfect strategies. These are strategies which are optimal to implement now given that they will be implemented in the future. Ekeland and Lazrak [6] consider a deterministic problem with continuous time, namely the Ramsey problem of economic growth with non-exponential discounting. They define subgame perfect strategies and characterize them by a generalized HJB (the non local extension of HJB). Ekeland and Pirvu [7] look at the Merton problem with special types of non-constant deterministic discount rates, and introduced/characterize subgame perfect strategies. [8] extends [7] by allowing general non-constant deterministic discount rates and life insurance acquisition in their model. Related works are done in [12] , [13] and [14] . [2] develops a general theory for stochastic control problems which are time inconsistent and introduced the subgame perfect subgame perefect tstrategies in a fairly general stochastic framework. Björk, Murgoci and Zhou [3] look at the mean variance problem with time changing risk aversion which is also time inconsistent.
In this paper, unlike previous works we consider a stochastic discount rates framework. The goal is to characterize the subgame perfect strategies. The methodology developed in [8] is employed to achieve this; it mixes the idea of value function (from the dynamic programming principle) with the idea that in the future "optimal trading strategies" are to be implemented (from the maximum principle of Pontryagin). The new twist in our paper is the Markov chain, and the mathematical ingredient used is Itô's formula for the Markov-modulated diffusions. Thus, we obtain a system of four equations: first equation says that the value function is equal to the continuation utility of subgame perfect strategies; second equation is the wealth equation generated by subgame perfect strategies; the last two equations relate the value function to the subgame perfect strategies. The end result is a complicated system of PDEs, SDE and a nonlinear equation with a nonlocal term which can be solved for CRRA type utility. In this case we find an ansatz for the value function ( by disentangling the time, the space and the Markov chain state component). This leads to subgame perfect strategies which are time/state dependent and linear in wealth. If constant discount rates, we notice that subgame perfect strategies coincide with the optimal ones. In a remark we discuss the pre-commitment strategies; these are strategies that a decision maker would implement if there exists a commitment mechanism.
Our contribution is to show that stochastic rates of time preference lead to time inconsistent optimal strategies. Moreover, our resolution is to characterize subgame perfect strategies which are a substitute for the optimal strategies within this context. The contributions of this paper are: first, to consider a model with stochastic discount rates, and for the special case of CRRA preference to compare by numerical experiments subgame perfect strategies and pre-commitment strategies.
Numerical findings show the dependence on the model's parameters of the subgame perfect strategies and pre-commitment strategies. In one example we notice that a higher discount rate leads to a higher subgame perfect consumption rate; in another example we show that this is not the case if we allow the market parameters to switch.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In section 2 we describe the model and formulate the objective. Section 3 contains the main result. Section 4 considers the special case of CRRA preferences. Section 5 presents a numerical experiment. The paper ends with an appendix. Our results hold true in the more general situation of S having finitely many states. The filtration {F t } 0≤t≤∞ is the completed filtration generated by {W (t)} t∈[0,∞) and
We assume that the stochastic processes W and J are independent. The MC J has a generator Λ = [λ ij ] S×S with λ ij ≥ 0 for i = j, and j∈S λ ij = 0 for every i ∈ S.
In our setup the financial market consists of a bank account B and a risky asset S, that are traded continuously over a finite time horizon [0, T ] (here T ∈ (0, ∞) is an exogenously given deterministic time). The price process of the bank account and risky asset are governed by the following Markov-modulated SDE:
where B(0) = 1 and S(0) = s > 0 are the initial prices. The functions r(t, i), α(t, i), σ(t, i) : i ∈ S, are assumed to be deterministic, positive and continuous in t. They represent the riskless rate, the stock return and the stock volatility (given the state i of the MC at t). Moreover
stands for the stock excess return.
Investment-consumption strategies and wealth processes
In our model, an investor continuously invests in the stock, bond and consumes. Let π(t) be the dollar value invested in stock at time t and c(t) ≥ 0 be the consumption. X u (t) X(t) represents the wealth of the investor at time t associated with the trading strategy u = (π, c); it satisfies the following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
where X(0) = x > 0 is the initial wealth and J 0 = i ∈ S is the initial state. This SDE is called the self-financing condition. An acceptable investment-consumption strategy is defined below:
is called an admissible strategy process and write u ∈ A if it is F t − progressively measurable and it satisfies the following integrability condition
Here U is a utility function and is defined in the next subsection.
Under the regularity condition (2.2) imposed on {π(t), c(t)} t∈[0,∞) above, the SDE (2.1) admits a unique strong solution.
2.3
The risk preferences A utility function U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave differentiable real-valued function defined on [0, ∞) which satisfies the Inada conditions
The strictly decreasing function U ′ maps (0, ∞) onto (0, ∞) and hence has a strictly decreasing inverse I : (0, ∞) → (0, ∞).
The discount rate
As we mentioned in the introduction, this paper considers stochastic discount rates. An easy way to achieve this is to let the discount rate depend on the state of the MC. Thus, at some intermediate time t ∈ [0, T ] the discount rate is ρ J(t) , for some positive constants ρ 0 and ρ 1 . The intuition of this way of modeling discount rates stems from the connection between market states and discount rates (this can be explained by some models with endogenous discount rates which are influenced by economic factors).
The Risk Criterion
In our model, the investor decides what investment/consumption strategy to choose according to the expected utility risk criterion. Thus, investor's goal is to maximize utility of intertemporal consumption and final wealth. The novelty here is that we allow investor to update the risk criterion and to reconsider the optimal strategies she/he computed in the past. This will lead to a time inconsistent behaviour as we show below. Let the agent start with a given positive wealth x, and a given market state i, at some instant t. The t−optimal trading strategy {π t (s),c t (s)} s∈[t,T ] is chosen to maximize the time t optimization criterion
T ] is derived by the supermartingale/martingale principle. In the following t stands for the initial time and s stands for the time to go, i.e., s ∈ [t, T ]. Let V (t, s, x, i) be the value function associated with maximizing the time t criterion
This is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
with the boundary condition
Here i stands for the value of MC at time t. Thus, the HJB depends on the current time t through ρ J(t) and this dependence is inherited by the t−optimal trading strategy. This in turn leads to time inconsistencies. Let us detail on this; if at time 0 the market state is 0, that is J(0) = 0, the HJB equation (2.6) depends on ρ 0 , leading to the corresponding time 0-optimal consumption strategy (which depends on ρ 0 through the first order conditions)c ρ 0 ; if at a later point in time t 1 the market state is 1, that is J(t 1 ) = 1, the HJB equation (2.6) depends on ρ 1 , leading to the corresponding optimal consumption strategy (which depends on ρ 1 through the first order conditions)c ρ 1 ; The time inconsistency is due to the fact that time 0-optimal strategy fails to remain optimal, i.e.,c ρ 0 (t) =c ρ 1 (t) for t ≥ t 1 . Notice that the value function V depends on two time points t and s. Thus, the time 0-optimal strategy is also optimal for time t optimization criterion. This is no longer the case if ρ 0 = ρ 1 , and J(0) = J(t). One resolution of time inconsistency is to introduce subgame perfect strategies. They are optimal now given that they will be implemented in the future.
The Main Result

The subgame perfect trading strategies
For an admissible strategy {u(t) π(t), c(t)} t∈[0,T ] and its corresponding wealth process {X u (t)} t∈[0,T ] given by (2.1), we denote the expected utility functional by
(3.8)
Following [7] we shall give a rigorous mathematical formulation of the subgame perefect strategies in the formal definition below. 
The value function
Our goal is in a first step to characterize the subgame perfect strategies and then to find them in special cases. Inspired by [7] , the value function v : [0, T ] × R + × S → R is a C Moreover, F = (F 1 , F 2 ) is defined by In the light of this assumption and by the Feyman-Kac Theorem it follows that
By ( Proof: By differentiating (3.18) with respect to t we get 
Similarly we get the PDE forv. For the converse let us define
Then by Feyman-Kac Theorem it follows that
so v satisfies (3.13).
The following Theorem states the central result of our paper. Proof: Let us define
The concavity of v and the first order conditions lead to 
By the same token one can get that
Itô's formula yields
(the inequality follows from (3.27)).
CRRA Preferences
In this section we assume that the utility is of power type, i.e., U (x) = U γ (x) = x γ γ . Let us take advantage of the special form of the utility function to simplify the problem of finding v. When γ = 0 we search for v of the form:
When γ = 0 (logarithmic utility) we look for v of the form v(t, x, i) = g(t, i) log x + l(t, i), x ≥ 0.
(4.33)
The functions g(t, i) and l(t, i) are to be found. In light of equations (3.15) one gets
Note that the function l(t, i) does not enter the above equation so its expression is not important. By (3.14) , the associated wealth process satisfies the following SDE:
This is a linear SDE which can be easily solved. By plugging v of (4.32) into (3.13) (with F 1 , F 2 of (4.34) andX of (4.35), we obtain the following system of four equations for g(t, i),ḡ(t, i), i ∈ S :
(4.37) with the final condition g(T, i) =ḡ(T, i) = 1, i ∈ S. Next we show that there exists a unique solution for this ODE system. Let us summarize Lemma 4.1. There exists a unique continuously differentiable uniformly bounded solution g(t, i),ḡ(t, i), i ∈ S for the system (4.36) and (4.37). Furthermore, v(t, x, i) = g(t, i) x γ γ is a value function, meaning that v is continuously differentiable, concave in x and satisfies (3.13) with F 1 , F 2 of (4.34) andX of (4.35).
Appendix A. proves this Lemma. is a subgame perfect strategy.
Proof: Let us notice that the boundedness of g and the fact thatX of (4.35) is positive and it has finite moments of any order imply the acceptability of {π(s),c(s)} s∈[0,T ] . Next, the conclusion follows from Theorem 3.4.
Remark 4.3. In the case of constant discount rate, i.e., ρ 0 = ρ 1 , the subgame perfect strategies coincide with the optimal ones. This can be seen by looking at the equation (3.20) which is exactly HJB (2.6) (after the first order conditions are implemented and by using v =v (see (3.18) and (3.19) ). The optimal investment and consumption problem is solved in closed form by [5] within this framework. • a naive strategy that switches in between the two pre-commitment strategies.
Numerical Analysis
In this section, we use Matlab's powerful ODE solvers (especially the functions ode23 and ode45) to perform numerical experiments. We numerically solve ODE systems (4.36), (4.39) and (4.40) to get the subgame perfect and pre-commitment strategies. We take the Markov Chain generator to be −2 2 1.5 −1.5
We plot the subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates denoted bȳ C(t, J(t)) F 2 (t,X(t), J(t)) X(t) = g 1 γ−1 (t, J(t)),
(t, J(t)), k = 1, 2. Fig. 1 . Subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates for µ 0 = 0.1, µ 1 = 0.1, σ 0 = 0.2, σ 1 = 0.2, r 0 = 0.05, r 1 = 0.05; the discount rates ρ 0 = 0.3, ρ 1 = 0.06. Fig. 2 . Subgame perfect and pre-commitment consumption rates for µ 0 = 0.1, µ 1 = 0.1, σ 0 = 0.2, σ 1 = 0.2, r 0 = 0.01, r 1 = 0.09; the discount rates ρ 0 = 0.07, ρ 1 = 0.06.
Remark 5.1. Numerical findings reveal the complex dependence of the subgame perfect and precommitment consumption rates on the model parameters. In figure 1 we have the same market coefficients on the two states and a higher discount rate on the first state. This leads to higher subgame perfect consumption rate in the first state (in figure 1 notice thatC(t, 1) =Ĉ 2 (t, 0) = C 2 (t, 1). In figure 2 we also let the interest rate depend on the regime. Here although ρ 0 = 0.07 > ρ 1 = 0.06, C(t, 1) >C(t, 0). The difference between different consumption rates becomes more pronounced for higher γ. Existence and uniqueness for the ODE system is granted locally in time. For global existence and uniqueness we eastablish global estimates. Let α(t, i) = − γr(t, i) + µ 2 (t,i)γ 2σ 2 (t,i)(1−γ) − ρ i + λ ii , i ∈ S, andᾱ(t, i) = − γr(t, i) + µ 2 (t,i)γ 2σ 2 (t,i)(1−γ) − ρ j + λ ii , i, j ∈ S. Then from the ODE system we get ∂g ∂t (t, i) − α(t, i)g(t, i) ≤ 0, ∂ḡ ∂t (t, i) −ᾱ(t, i)ḡ(t, i) ≤ 0, i ∈ S.
Integrating this from t to T and using g(T, i) =ḡ(T, i) = 1, i ∈ S we get a global lower bound M > 0 for g,ḡ. Next, since γ < 1, from the ODE system Integrating this from t to T yields the desired upper bound.
Recall that v(t, x, i) = g(t, i) x γ γ , and definev byv(t, x, i) ḡ(t, i) x γ γ . Then it can be easily shown that (v,v) solves (3.20), (3.21) . Then by Lemma 3.3, v satisfies (3.13).
